Peter Zeller 

Military History Thoughts - 

The American military campaign in New York and New Jersey in the summer, fall, and winter of 1776 set the tone for the conflict now known as the American War for Independence.  General George Washington’s decision to engage the British in this campaign served the overall American strategic interests.  The American congress, in July 1776, declared to the world that the 13 colonies, from that point forward, be considered “Free and Independent States.”  Any analysis of Washington’s decision to engage the British at this critical juncture must take the Declaration into account and must be understood from the political, economic, and military situation in the late spring and early summer of 1776.   

The political strategic interest of America, and Washington’s decision to defend New York, at the opening of the campaign can be divided into two parts, domestic and international.  Clausewitz states succinctly in On War “No major proposal required for war can be worked out in ignorance of political factors…”  Washington understood this implicitly with his analysis of the New York question in the early summer of 1776.  He worked with Congress to plan his response to the expected invasion of New York by the Howe brothers following their retreat to Halifax from Boston.  Washington knew that Patriots  (certainly not the Tories) in general were interested in building up a new republic, support their declared independence, and defend the major city that tied New England with the rest of the newly formed states.  Britain believed that capturing New York could fatally weaken the Revolution because it would sever the strong Revolutionary sentiment in New England from the less fervent sentiment farther south.  New Jersey by extension, following, the fall of New York, was defended by Washington under similar domestic political strategic interests.

From an international perspective, Washington and Congress understood they had to show France (and Spain by extension) that the victories at Boston and Bunker Hill (Breed’s Hill) were no accidents but victories won by a capable American army that could translate early victories into long term gains.  If Washington did this, France would be more likely to join the fight earlier rather than later and likely shorten the war.  Additionally, Washington would at the same time influence British elites and overall public opinion that it would be fruitless to carry on a war against such a strong military opponent firmly situated over 3000 miles from Britain’s shores.  New Jersey was lost so quickly by Washington in the early winter of 76 that there was little initial international knowledge of the events.  By the time most in Europe understood the defeats in New York and New Jersey, Washington had already struck at Trenton and Princeton reversing the potentially devastating defeats in the minds of key European states.  

Bottom Line - Washington enabled the ultimate success of the Revolution by defending New York and New Jersey in 76 and 77. His disastrous defeats ultimately led to the scenario of victory at the battle of Trenton (Dec 76), the brilliant stalemate he fought the British to at the Battle of Assunpink Creek on 2 Jan 77 and the final victory at Princeton. These gave new life to the Revolutionary spirit that never again dimmed to such a bleak place.