Peter
Zeller
Military
History Thoughts -
The
American military campaign in New York and New Jersey in the summer, fall, and
winter of 1776 set the tone for the conflict now known as the American War for
Independence. General George Washington’s decision to engage the British
in this campaign served the overall American strategic interests. The
American congress, in July 1776, declared to the world that the 13 colonies,
from that point forward, be considered “Free and Independent States.” Any
analysis of Washington’s decision to engage the British at this critical
juncture must take the Declaration into account and must be understood from the
political, economic, and military situation in the late spring and early summer
of 1776.
The
political strategic interest of America, and Washington’s decision to defend
New York, at the opening of the campaign can be divided into two parts,
domestic and international. Clausewitz states succinctly in On
War “No major proposal required for war can be worked out in ignorance
of political factors…” Washington understood this implicitly with
his analysis of the New York question in the early summer of 1776. He
worked with Congress to plan his response to the expected invasion of New York
by the Howe brothers following their retreat to Halifax from Boston. Washington
knew that Patriots (certainly not the Tories) in general were interested
in building up a new republic, support their declared independence, and defend
the major city that tied New England with the rest of the newly formed
states. Britain believed that capturing New York could fatally weaken the
Revolution because it would sever the strong Revolutionary sentiment in New
England from the less fervent sentiment farther south. New Jersey by
extension, following, the fall of New York, was defended by Washington under
similar domestic political strategic interests.
From
an international perspective, Washington and Congress understood they had to
show France (and Spain by extension) that the victories at Boston and Bunker
Hill (Breed’s Hill) were no accidents but victories won by a capable American
army that could translate early victories into long term gains. If
Washington did this, France would be more likely to join the fight earlier
rather than later and likely shorten the war. Additionally, Washington
would at the same time influence British elites and overall public opinion that
it would be fruitless to carry on a war against such a strong military opponent
firmly situated over 3000 miles from Britain’s shores. New Jersey
was lost so quickly by Washington in the early winter of 76 that there was
little initial international knowledge of the events. By the time
most in Europe understood the defeats in New York and New Jersey, Washington
had already struck at Trenton and Princeton reversing the potentially
devastating defeats in the minds of key European states.
Bottom
Line - Washington enabled the ultimate success of the Revolution by defending
New York and New Jersey in 76 and 77. His disastrous defeats ultimately led to
the scenario of victory at the battle of Trenton (Dec 76), the brilliant
stalemate he fought the British to at the Battle of Assunpink Creek on 2 Jan 77
and the final victory at Princeton. These gave new life to the Revolutionary
spirit that never again dimmed to such a bleak place.
